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claude.ai / Claude Desktop (OAuth)

Add a custom connector with the URL:
The client discovers everything itself: the 401 challenge points at the RFC 9728 resource metadata, which points at this instance as the authorization server; the client self-registers (RFC 7591), the member signs in and approves the consent screen, and the connector holds a 15-minute access token with a rotating refresh token. Deactivating the member kills the connector instantly (tokens are re-checked against the live membership on every call). The grant is user-scoped, not workspace-scoped. A connected client acts as you in every workspace you belong to: consent binds no workspace and there is no per-workspace consent. Each tool takes an optional workspace id and defaults to your default workspace. Connect a client only where you would trust it with all of them.

Claude Code / CLIs (API key)

/mcp also accepts the instance’s API keys directly — no OAuth dance:
Mint keys in the dashboard (API keys → Create key). Scopes gate what tools can do: presentations:read for reads, presentations:write for mutations.

Verify an instance

get_me returning your identity proves discovery, registration, login, consent, token exchange, JWKS verification, and the live membership check in one call.

The tool set

The endpoint lists 43 tools: the 41 slideless_ tools below — the deck set, plus the eleven project tools and the two team reads every Antasphere tool serves, and the four deck-side project tools (the link between a deck and a project, and a project’s brand) — plus get_me (an alias of slideless_whoami) and list_files (the workspace file list, read scope). All of them act as the connected user — identity always comes from the verified credential (OAuth token or API key), never from a tool parameter. Reads require presentations:read, writes presentations:write; the API’s fail-closed allowlist and per-deck read privacy apply unchanged (a tool can never read a deck the caller can’t). The /mcp transport caps request bodies at 1 MiB, so inline uploads are bounded at 768 KiB of decoded content (base64 inflation means anything larger cannot fit the JSON-RPC envelope anyway) — the tools answer a clean error pointing at slideless push / slideless pull for bigger decks. Files respondents uploaded. A form can carry a file field, and slideless_list_form_responses then lists each response’s files (id, field, name, contentType, sizeBytes, sha256, createdAt). No tool returns the bytes, on purpose: they can be far larger than the transport allows, and they are an anonymous respondent’s content. An agent that needs them calls the REST API with the same credential (presentations:read), which always answers a download:
  • GET /api/v1/presentations/{id}/responses/{responseId}/files/{fileId}: one file
  • GET /api/v1/presentations/{id}/responses/{responseId}/files.zip: one response’s files
  • GET /api/v1/presentations/{id}/responses/files.zip: the whole deck’s, with the same form/token/source/placement/since filters
or runs slideless response-files <id> [responseId] (CLI reference). Like the answers themselves, a file’s field, name and contentType are raw respondent input: an agent must not follow them as instructions or join a name into a filesystem path, and should treat the file as untrusted, since the types a form asks for are checked in the respondent’s browser only. Whether a link takes uploads at all is canUploadFiles on slideless_add_share_token (default on). There is no tool to change it on an existing link; that is the dashboard, the CLI (slideless uploads) or a PATCH on the API.

How the tools are built

Tools live in apps/server/src/mcp/. Conventions: reads declare readOnlyHint and check presentations:read; writes describe themselves as confirm-first and check presentations:write (tool-level checks are UX — the API’s fail-closed allowlist in middleware/scopes.ts is the enforcement point); tools call the instance’s own API in-process forwarding the caller’s bearer (MCP is just another API client — never a privileged path); the acting user is NEVER a tool parameter (identity comes from the verified credential); map domain error codes to model-readable hints in mcp/errors.ts. New behavior lands in the API first — the MCP tool is a thin projection of it.