> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.antasphere.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # The MCP connector > Every instance is MCP-capable at boot: the monolith serves a streamable-HTTP MCP endpoint at /mcp, protected by the instance's own built-in OAuth 2.1 authorization server. No companion service, no shared secrets, no aud/resource URL to keep in sync — the resource identifier is derived at boot as PUBLIC_BASE_URL + '/mcp'. ## claude.ai / Claude Desktop (OAuth) Add a custom connector with the URL: ``` https://slides.example.com/mcp ``` The client discovers everything itself: the 401 challenge points at the RFC 9728 resource metadata, which points at this instance as the authorization server; the client self-registers (RFC 7591), the member signs in and approves the consent screen, and the connector holds a 15-minute access token with a rotating refresh token. Deactivating the member kills the connector instantly (tokens are re-checked against the live membership on every call). The consent screen names the workspace being granted, and the grant is bound to exactly that workspace for its whole life — refreshes included. Members of several workspaces pick one at consent; connecting the same client to another workspace is a second consent (send `prompt=consent` to force the picker past an existing grant). ## Claude Code / CLIs (API key) `/mcp` also accepts the instance's API keys directly — no OAuth dance: ```bash theme={null} claude mcp add --transport http slideless https://slides.example.com/mcp \ --header "Authorization: Bearer slk_..." ``` Mint keys in the dashboard (API keys → Create key). Scopes gate what tools can do: `presentations:read` for reads, `presentations:write` for mutations. ## Verify an instance ```bash theme={null} curl -s https://slides.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp | jq npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector # connect → OAuth dance → call get_me ``` `get_me` returning your identity proves discovery, registration, login, consent, token exchange, JWKS verification, and the live membership check in one call. ## The tool set All product tools are prefixed `slideless_` and act as the connected user — identity always comes from the verified credential (OAuth token or API key), never from a tool parameter. Reads require `presentations:read`, writes `presentations:write`; the API's fail-closed allowlist and per-deck read privacy apply unchanged (a tool can never read a deck the caller can't). | Tool | Scope | Does | | ------------------------------------- | ----- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `slideless_whoami` | read | The connected user, workspace, role, scopes (`get_me` is the chassis alias) | | `slideless_list_presentations` | read | Cursor-paginated deck list, scoped by per-deck read privacy | | `slideless_get_presentation` | read | One deck's metadata | | `slideless_update_presentation` | write | Rename a deck / replace its `metadata` object (full replace, no version push) | | `slideless_get_agent_doc` | read | The deck's `AGENT.md` briefing as markdown (omit `version` = latest) | | `slideless_list_versions` | read | Version history (metadata only) | | `slideless_get_version` | read | One version incl. its full manifest and its `attachments` (the `downloads/` entries; omit `version` = latest) | | `slideless_download_version` | read | Manifest + text-file contents inlined (≤256 KiB/file, ≤1 MiB total); binary/oversized → CLI note | | `slideless_upload_html_presentation` | write | One HTML string → a new 1-file deck (precheck → upload → commit); answers with `url`, the deck's own page | | `slideless_upload_presentation_files` | write | Inline multi-file upload (`contentText`/`contentBase64`); with `presentationId` commits a new version; answers with `url`, the deck's own page. ≤768 KiB decoded total — bigger decks use the CLI | | `slideless_delete_presentation` | write | Soft delete (destructive, confirm-first) | | `slideless_add_share_token` | write | Mint a share link (name/pin/annotate/forms/downloads/bar/expiry/password: `canAnnotate`, `canSubmitForms`, `canDownload`, `showBar`, see [Share links](/slideless/concepts/links)); returns the viewer URL once | | `slideless_list_share_tokens` | read | A deck's tokens with access stats: `accessCount` (the views), `downloadCount`, `canDownload`, `showBar` (secrets never retrievable) | | `slideless_list_token_views` | read | One token's per-view events: time, referrer host, `?p=` label, browser family (no IPs) | | `slideless_set_token_version_mode` | write | Pin a token to a version / follow latest | | `slideless_unshare_presentation` | write | Revoke one token, or ALL active tokens when `tokenId` is omitted (destructive) | | `slideless_share_via_email` | write | Email a token's link (delivered sends ROTATE the secret) | | `slideless_invite_collaborator` | write | Per-deck dev grant; returns the claim URL | | `slideless_uninvite_collaborator` | write | Revoke a grant (destructive, immediate) | | `slideless_list_collaborators` | read | A deck's grant roster | | `slideless_list_annotations` | read | Per-deck notes, or the workspace inbox when `presentationId` is omitted; filters `version`/`status` | | `slideless_list_form_responses` | read | A deck's form responses (filters `form`/`token`/`source`/`placement`/`since`), or the grouped per-form × link × source × placement overview with `summary: true` | The `/mcp` transport caps request bodies at 1 MiB, so inline uploads are bounded at 768 KiB of decoded content (base64 inflation means anything larger cannot fit the JSON-RPC envelope anyway) — the tools answer a clean error pointing at `slideless push` / `slideless pull` for bigger decks. ## For products extending the template Tools live in `apps/server/src/mcp/`. Conventions (ported from a proven predecessor MCP template): reads declare `readOnlyHint` and check `presentations:read`; writes describe themselves as confirm-first and check `presentations:write` (tool-level checks are UX — the API's fail-closed allowlist in `middleware/scopes.ts` is the enforcement point); tools call the instance's own API in-process forwarding the caller's bearer (MCP is just another API client — never a privileged path); the acting user is NEVER a tool parameter (identity comes from the verified credential); map domain error codes to model-readable hints in `mcp/errors.ts`. New behavior lands in the API first — the MCP tool is a thin projection of it.